One Call Away. Ownership Chains and Ease of Communication in Multinational Enterprises

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Miricola, Stefania, Rungi, Armando, Santoni, Gianluca
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2023
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author Miricola, Stefania
Rungi, Armando
Santoni, Gianluca
author_facet Miricola, Stefania
Rungi, Armando
Santoni, Gianluca
contents This study examines how multinational enterprises structure ownership chains to coordinate subsidiaries across multiple national borders. Using a unique global dataset, we first document key stylized facts: 54% of subsidiaries are controlled through indirect ownership, and ownership chains can span up to seven countries. In particular, we find that subsidiaries further down the control hierarchy tend to be more geographically distant from the parent and operate in different time zones. This suggests that the ease of communication along ownership chains is a critical determinant of their structure. On the other hand, tax optimization strategies are not correlated with locations along ownership chains. Motivated by previous findings, we develop a location choice model in which parent firms compete for corporate control of final subsidiaries, but monitoring is costly, and they can delegate control to an intermediate affiliate in another jurisdiction. The model generates a two-stage empirical strategy: (i) a trilateral equation that determines the location of an intermediate affiliate conditional on the location of final subsidiaries; and (ii) a bilateral equation that predicts the location of final investment. Our empirical estimates confirm that the ease of communication at the country level has a significant influence on the location decisions of affiliates along ownership chains. Our findings underscore the importance of communication frictions in shaping global corporate structures, and provide new insights into the geography of multinational ownership networks.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2305_12857
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle One Call Away. Ownership Chains and Ease of Communication in Multinational Enterprises
Miricola, Stefania
Rungi, Armando
Santoni, Gianluca
General Economics
Economics
This study examines how multinational enterprises structure ownership chains to coordinate subsidiaries across multiple national borders. Using a unique global dataset, we first document key stylized facts: 54% of subsidiaries are controlled through indirect ownership, and ownership chains can span up to seven countries. In particular, we find that subsidiaries further down the control hierarchy tend to be more geographically distant from the parent and operate in different time zones. This suggests that the ease of communication along ownership chains is a critical determinant of their structure. On the other hand, tax optimization strategies are not correlated with locations along ownership chains. Motivated by previous findings, we develop a location choice model in which parent firms compete for corporate control of final subsidiaries, but monitoring is costly, and they can delegate control to an intermediate affiliate in another jurisdiction. The model generates a two-stage empirical strategy: (i) a trilateral equation that determines the location of an intermediate affiliate conditional on the location of final subsidiaries; and (ii) a bilateral equation that predicts the location of final investment. Our empirical estimates confirm that the ease of communication at the country level has a significant influence on the location decisions of affiliates along ownership chains. Our findings underscore the importance of communication frictions in shaping global corporate structures, and provide new insights into the geography of multinational ownership networks.
title One Call Away. Ownership Chains and Ease of Communication in Multinational Enterprises
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.12857