Securing Cloud File Systems with Trusted Execution
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866917793360773120 |
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| author | Burke, Quinn Beugin, Yohan Hoak, Blaine King, Rachel Pauley, Eric Sheatsley, Ryan Yu, Mingli He, Ting La Porta, Thomas McDaniel, Patrick |
| author_facet | Burke, Quinn Beugin, Yohan Hoak, Blaine King, Rachel Pauley, Eric Sheatsley, Ryan Yu, Mingli He, Ting La Porta, Thomas McDaniel, Patrick |
| contents | Cloud file systems offer organizations a scalable and reliable file storage solution. However, cloud file systems have become prime targets for adversaries, and traditional designs are not equipped to protect organizations against the myriad of attacks that may be initiated by a malicious cloud provider, co-tenant, or end-client. Recently proposed designs leveraging cryptographic techniques and trusted execution environments (TEEs) still force organizations to make undesirable trade-offs, consequently leading to either security, functional, or performance limitations. In this paper, we introduce BFS, a cloud file system that leverages the security capabilities provided by TEEs to bootstrap new security protocols that deliver strong security guarantees, high-performance, and a transparent POSIX-like interface to clients. BFS delivers stronger security guarantees and up to a 2.5X speedup over a state-of-the-art secure file system. Moreover, compared to the industry standard NFS, BFS achieves up to 2.2X speedups across micro-benchmarks and incurs <1X overhead for most macro-benchmark workloads. BFS demonstrates a holistic cloud file system design that does not sacrifice an organizations' security yet can embrace all of the functional and performance advantages of outsourcing. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2305_18639 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Securing Cloud File Systems with Trusted Execution Burke, Quinn Beugin, Yohan Hoak, Blaine King, Rachel Pauley, Eric Sheatsley, Ryan Yu, Mingli He, Ting La Porta, Thomas McDaniel, Patrick Cryptography and Security Operating Systems Cloud file systems offer organizations a scalable and reliable file storage solution. However, cloud file systems have become prime targets for adversaries, and traditional designs are not equipped to protect organizations against the myriad of attacks that may be initiated by a malicious cloud provider, co-tenant, or end-client. Recently proposed designs leveraging cryptographic techniques and trusted execution environments (TEEs) still force organizations to make undesirable trade-offs, consequently leading to either security, functional, or performance limitations. In this paper, we introduce BFS, a cloud file system that leverages the security capabilities provided by TEEs to bootstrap new security protocols that deliver strong security guarantees, high-performance, and a transparent POSIX-like interface to clients. BFS delivers stronger security guarantees and up to a 2.5X speedup over a state-of-the-art secure file system. Moreover, compared to the industry standard NFS, BFS achieves up to 2.2X speedups across micro-benchmarks and incurs <1X overhead for most macro-benchmark workloads. BFS demonstrates a holistic cloud file system design that does not sacrifice an organizations' security yet can embrace all of the functional and performance advantages of outsourcing. |
| title | Securing Cloud File Systems with Trusted Execution |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Operating Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.18639 |