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Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Gkatzelis, Vasilis, Psomas, Alexandros, Tan, Xizhi, Verma, Paritosh
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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