FheFL: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Friendly Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning with Byzantine Users

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Rahulamathavan, Yogachandran, Herath, Charuka, Liu, Xiaolan, Lambotharan, Sangarapillai, Maple, Carsten
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
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author Rahulamathavan, Yogachandran
Herath, Charuka
Liu, Xiaolan
Lambotharan, Sangarapillai
Maple, Carsten
author_facet Rahulamathavan, Yogachandran
Herath, Charuka
Liu, Xiaolan
Lambotharan, Sangarapillai
Maple, Carsten
contents The federated learning (FL) technique was developed to mitigate data privacy issues in the traditional machine learning paradigm. While FL ensures that a user's data always remain with the user, the gradients are shared with the centralized server to build the global model. This results in privacy leakage, where the server can infer private information from the shared gradients. To mitigate this flaw, the next-generation FL architectures proposed encryption and anonymization techniques to protect the model updates from the server. However, this approach creates other challenges, such as malicious users sharing false gradients. Since the gradients are encrypted, the server is unable to identify rogue users. To mitigate both attacks, this paper proposes a novel FL algorithm based on a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. We develop a distributed multi-key additive homomorphic encryption scheme that supports model aggregation in FL. We also develop a novel aggregation scheme within the encrypted domain, utilizing users' non-poisoning rates, to effectively address data poisoning attacks while ensuring privacy is preserved by the proposed encryption scheme. Rigorous security, privacy, convergence, and experimental analyses have been provided to show that FheFL is novel, secure, and private, and achieves comparable accuracy at reasonable computational cost.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2306_05112
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle FheFL: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Friendly Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning with Byzantine Users
Rahulamathavan, Yogachandran
Herath, Charuka
Liu, Xiaolan
Lambotharan, Sangarapillai
Maple, Carsten
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
The federated learning (FL) technique was developed to mitigate data privacy issues in the traditional machine learning paradigm. While FL ensures that a user's data always remain with the user, the gradients are shared with the centralized server to build the global model. This results in privacy leakage, where the server can infer private information from the shared gradients. To mitigate this flaw, the next-generation FL architectures proposed encryption and anonymization techniques to protect the model updates from the server. However, this approach creates other challenges, such as malicious users sharing false gradients. Since the gradients are encrypted, the server is unable to identify rogue users. To mitigate both attacks, this paper proposes a novel FL algorithm based on a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. We develop a distributed multi-key additive homomorphic encryption scheme that supports model aggregation in FL. We also develop a novel aggregation scheme within the encrypted domain, utilizing users' non-poisoning rates, to effectively address data poisoning attacks while ensuring privacy is preserved by the proposed encryption scheme. Rigorous security, privacy, convergence, and experimental analyses have been provided to show that FheFL is novel, secure, and private, and achieves comparable accuracy at reasonable computational cost.
title FheFL: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Friendly Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning with Byzantine Users
topic Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.05112