An Isotonic Mechanism for Overlapping Ownership
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Wu, Jibang, Xu, Haifeng, Guo, Yifan, Su, Weijie |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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