Dynamic Net Metering for Energy Communities
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866916228848680960 |
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| author | Alahmed, Ahmed S. Tong, Lang |
| author_facet | Alahmed, Ahmed S. Tong, Lang |
| contents | We propose a social welfare maximizing market mechanism for an energy community that aggregates individual and community-shared energy resources under a general net energy metering (NEM) policy. Referred to as Dynamic NEM (D-NEM), the proposed mechanism dynamically sets the community NEM prices based on aggregated community resources, including flexible consumption, storage, and renewable generation. D-NEM guarantees a higher benefit to each community member than possible outside the community, and no sub-communities would be better off departing from its parent community. D-NEM aligns each member's incentive with that of the community such that each member maximizing individual surplus under D-NEM results in maximum community social welfare. Empirical studies compare the proposed mechanism with existing benchmarks, demonstrating its welfare benefits, operational characteristics, and responsiveness to NEM rates. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2306_13677 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dynamic Net Metering for Energy Communities Alahmed, Ahmed S. Tong, Lang Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control We propose a social welfare maximizing market mechanism for an energy community that aggregates individual and community-shared energy resources under a general net energy metering (NEM) policy. Referred to as Dynamic NEM (D-NEM), the proposed mechanism dynamically sets the community NEM prices based on aggregated community resources, including flexible consumption, storage, and renewable generation. D-NEM guarantees a higher benefit to each community member than possible outside the community, and no sub-communities would be better off departing from its parent community. D-NEM aligns each member's incentive with that of the community such that each member maximizing individual surplus under D-NEM results in maximum community social welfare. Empirical studies compare the proposed mechanism with existing benchmarks, demonstrating its welfare benefits, operational characteristics, and responsiveness to NEM rates. |
| title | Dynamic Net Metering for Energy Communities |
| topic | Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13677 |