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Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Amin, Saurabh, Jaillet, Patrick, Pulyassary, Haripriya, Wu, Manxi
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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