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Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Amanatidis, Georgios, Klumper, Sophie, Markakis, Evangelos, Schäfer, Guido, Tsikiridis, Artem
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2023
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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