Imagen de Portada

Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Arieli, Itai, Babichenko, Yakov, Sandomirskiy, Fedor
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2023
Materias:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Robust Price Discrimination
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Testing Decision Makers without Counterfactuals
por: Babichenko, Yakov
Publicado: (2026)

Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
por: Sandomirskiy, Fedor, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation
por: Rudov, Kirill, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Private Private Information
por: He, Kevin, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Stable matching as transport
por: Echenique, Federico, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Statistical Equilibrium of Optimistic Beliefs
por: Gui, Yu, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs
por: Chen, Yi-Chun, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
por: Allman, Maxwell, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Persuading while Learning
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
por: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Distributed Interview Selection for Stable Matching in Large Random Markets
por: Cole, Richard, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Information Design with Elicitation and Strategic Coordination
por: Bonatti, Alessandro, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Binary Mechanisms under Privacy-Preserving Noise
por: Pourbabaee, Farzad, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
por: Balcan, Maria-Florina, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
por: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
por: Finster, Simon, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

The Multi-BMBY Mechanism: Proportionality-Preserving and Strategyproof Ownership Restructuring in Private Companies
por: Danino, Gal, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
por: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

A Gale-Shapley View of Unique Stable Marriages
por: Gokhale, Kartik, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
por: Brandl, Florian, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes
por: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets
por: Goktas, Denizalp, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Egyptian Ratscrew: Discovering Dominant Strategies with Computational Game Theory
por: Diamond, Justin, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Wardrop Equilibrium Can Be Boundedly Rational: A New Behavioral Theory of Route Choice
por: Li, Jiayang, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
por: Ball, Ian, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World
por: Alimohammadi, Yeganeh, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks
por: Amin, Saurabh, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
por: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Monitoring with Rich Data
por: Frick, Mira, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights
por: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules
por: Dong, Chris, et al.
Publicado: (2023)