Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866929280353566720 |
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| author | Friedman, Evan Gonçalves, Duarte |
| author_facet | Friedman, Evan Gonçalves, Duarte |
| contents | Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2307_08011 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification Friedman, Evan Gonçalves, Duarte Theoretical Economics Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game. |
| title | Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.08011 |