QDoor: Exploiting Approximate Synthesis for Backdoor Attacks in Quantum Neural Networks
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| _version_ | 1866911778610348032 |
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| author | Chu, Cheng Chen, Fan Richerme, Philip Jiang, Lei |
| author_facet | Chu, Cheng Chen, Fan Richerme, Philip Jiang, Lei |
| contents | Quantum neural networks (QNNs) succeed in object recognition, natural language processing, and financial analysis. To maximize the accuracy of a QNN on a Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) computer, approximate synthesis modifies the QNN circuit by reducing error-prone 2-qubit quantum gates. The success of QNNs motivates adversaries to attack QNNs via backdoors. However, naïvely transplanting backdoors designed for classical neural networks to QNNs yields only low attack success rate, due to the noises and approximate synthesis on NISQ computers. Prior quantum circuit-based backdoors cannot selectively attack some inputs or work with all types of encoding layers of a QNN circuit. Moreover, it is easy to detect both transplanted and circuit-based backdoors in a QNN.
In this paper, we propose a novel and stealthy backdoor attack, QDoor, to achieve high attack success rate in approximately-synthesized QNN circuits by weaponizing unitary differences between uncompiled QNNs and their synthesized counterparts. QDoor trains a QNN behaving normally for all inputs with and without a trigger. However, after approximate synthesis, the QNN circuit always predicts any inputs with a trigger to a predefined class while still acts normally for benign inputs. Compared to prior backdoor attacks, QDoor improves the attack success rate by $13\times$ and the clean data accuracy by $65\%$ on average. Furthermore, prior backdoor detection techniques cannot find QDoor attacks in uncompiled QNN circuits. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2307_09529 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | QDoor: Exploiting Approximate Synthesis for Backdoor Attacks in Quantum Neural Networks Chu, Cheng Chen, Fan Richerme, Philip Jiang, Lei Quantum Physics Emerging Technologies Quantum neural networks (QNNs) succeed in object recognition, natural language processing, and financial analysis. To maximize the accuracy of a QNN on a Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) computer, approximate synthesis modifies the QNN circuit by reducing error-prone 2-qubit quantum gates. The success of QNNs motivates adversaries to attack QNNs via backdoors. However, naïvely transplanting backdoors designed for classical neural networks to QNNs yields only low attack success rate, due to the noises and approximate synthesis on NISQ computers. Prior quantum circuit-based backdoors cannot selectively attack some inputs or work with all types of encoding layers of a QNN circuit. Moreover, it is easy to detect both transplanted and circuit-based backdoors in a QNN. In this paper, we propose a novel and stealthy backdoor attack, QDoor, to achieve high attack success rate in approximately-synthesized QNN circuits by weaponizing unitary differences between uncompiled QNNs and their synthesized counterparts. QDoor trains a QNN behaving normally for all inputs with and without a trigger. However, after approximate synthesis, the QNN circuit always predicts any inputs with a trigger to a predefined class while still acts normally for benign inputs. Compared to prior backdoor attacks, QDoor improves the attack success rate by $13\times$ and the clean data accuracy by $65\%$ on average. Furthermore, prior backdoor detection techniques cannot find QDoor attacks in uncompiled QNN circuits. |
| title | QDoor: Exploiting Approximate Synthesis for Backdoor Attacks in Quantum Neural Networks |
| topic | Quantum Physics Emerging Technologies |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09529 |