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Main Author: Reason, Cathy M
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.10178
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author Reason, Cathy M
author_facet Reason, Cathy M
contents The no-supervenience theorem limits the capacity of physicalist theories to provide a comprehensive account of human consciousness. The proof of the theorem is difficult to formalize because it relies on both alethic and epistemic notions of possibility. This article outlines a formalizable proof using predicate modal logic in which the epistemic inferences are expressed in terms of an existing mathematical formalism, the inference device (Wolpert, 2008). The resulting proof shows definitely that any physicalist theory which describes a self-aware, intelligent system must be internally inconsistent.
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publishDate 2023
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spellingShingle A Formalizable Proof of the No-Supervenience Theorem: A Diagonal Limitation on the Viability of Physicalist Theories of Consciousness
Reason, Cathy M
Neurons and Cognition
The no-supervenience theorem limits the capacity of physicalist theories to provide a comprehensive account of human consciousness. The proof of the theorem is difficult to formalize because it relies on both alethic and epistemic notions of possibility. This article outlines a formalizable proof using predicate modal logic in which the epistemic inferences are expressed in terms of an existing mathematical formalism, the inference device (Wolpert, 2008). The resulting proof shows definitely that any physicalist theory which describes a self-aware, intelligent system must be internally inconsistent.
title A Formalizable Proof of the No-Supervenience Theorem: A Diagonal Limitation on the Viability of Physicalist Theories of Consciousness
topic Neurons and Cognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.10178