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Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Leme, Renato Paes, Schneider, Jon, Zhang, Hanrui
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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