Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| _version_ | 1866914275791994880 |
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| author | Elkind, Edith Greger, Matthias Lederer, Patrick Suksompong, Warut Teh, Nicholas |
| author_facet | Elkind, Edith Greger, Matthias Lederer, Patrick Suksompong, Warut Teh, Nicholas |
| contents | We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource. We consider two families of aggregation rules for this setting -- those based on coordinate-wise aggregation and those that optimize some notion of welfare -- as well as the recently proposed independent markets rule. We provide a detailed analysis of these rules from an axiomatic perspective, both for classic axioms, such as strategyproofness and Pareto optimality, and for novel axioms, some of which aim to capture proportionality in this setting. Our results indicate that a simple rule that computes the average of the proposals satisfies many of our axioms and fares better than all other considered rules in terms of fairness properties. We complement these results by presenting two characterizations of the average rule. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2307_15586 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences Elkind, Edith Greger, Matthias Lederer, Patrick Suksompong, Warut Teh, Nicholas Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource. We consider two families of aggregation rules for this setting -- those based on coordinate-wise aggregation and those that optimize some notion of welfare -- as well as the recently proposed independent markets rule. We provide a detailed analysis of these rules from an axiomatic perspective, both for classic axioms, such as strategyproofness and Pareto optimality, and for novel axioms, some of which aim to capture proportionality in this setting. Our results indicate that a simple rule that computes the average of the proposals satisfies many of our axioms and fares better than all other considered rules in terms of fairness properties. We complement these results by presenting two characterizations of the average rule. |
| title | Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15586 |