The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866910965129281536 |
|---|---|
| author | Brandt, Felix Grundbacher, Florian |
| author_facet | Brandt, Felix Grundbacher, Florian |
| contents | Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that refinements of the Banks set, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can also be disjoint from the bipartisan set. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2308_01881 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint Brandt, Felix Grundbacher, Florian Theoretical Economics Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that refinements of the Banks set, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can also be disjoint from the bipartisan set. |
| title | The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.01881 |