Hiding Backdoors within Event Sequence Data via Poisoning Attacks
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866910575956590592 |
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| author | Ermilova, Alina Kovtun, Elizaveta Berestnev, Dmitry Zaytsev, Alexey |
| author_facet | Ermilova, Alina Kovtun, Elizaveta Berestnev, Dmitry Zaytsev, Alexey |
| contents | The financial industry relies on deep learning models for making important decisions. This adoption brings new danger, as deep black-box models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In computer vision, one can shape the output during inference by performing an adversarial attack called poisoning via introducing a backdoor into the model during training. For sequences of financial transactions of a customer, insertion of a backdoor is harder to perform, as models operate over a more complex discrete space of sequences, and systematic checks for insecurities occur. We provide a method to introduce concealed backdoors, creating vulnerabilities without altering their functionality for uncontaminated data. To achieve this, we replace a clean model with a poisoned one that is aware of the availability of a backdoor and utilize this knowledge. Our most difficult for uncovering attacks include either additional supervised detection step of poisoned data activated during the test or well-hidden model weight modifications. The experimental study provides insights into how these effects vary across different datasets, architectures, and model components. Alternative methods and baselines, such as distillation-type regularization, are also explored but found to be less efficient. Conducted on three open transaction datasets and architectures, including LSTM, CNN, and Transformer, our findings not only illuminate the vulnerabilities in contemporary models but also can drive the construction of more robust systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2308_10201 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Hiding Backdoors within Event Sequence Data via Poisoning Attacks Ermilova, Alina Kovtun, Elizaveta Berestnev, Dmitry Zaytsev, Alexey Machine Learning Cryptography and Security The financial industry relies on deep learning models for making important decisions. This adoption brings new danger, as deep black-box models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In computer vision, one can shape the output during inference by performing an adversarial attack called poisoning via introducing a backdoor into the model during training. For sequences of financial transactions of a customer, insertion of a backdoor is harder to perform, as models operate over a more complex discrete space of sequences, and systematic checks for insecurities occur. We provide a method to introduce concealed backdoors, creating vulnerabilities without altering their functionality for uncontaminated data. To achieve this, we replace a clean model with a poisoned one that is aware of the availability of a backdoor and utilize this knowledge. Our most difficult for uncovering attacks include either additional supervised detection step of poisoned data activated during the test or well-hidden model weight modifications. The experimental study provides insights into how these effects vary across different datasets, architectures, and model components. Alternative methods and baselines, such as distillation-type regularization, are also explored but found to be less efficient. Conducted on three open transaction datasets and architectures, including LSTM, CNN, and Transformer, our findings not only illuminate the vulnerabilities in contemporary models but also can drive the construction of more robust systems. |
| title | Hiding Backdoors within Event Sequence Data via Poisoning Attacks |
| topic | Machine Learning Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.10201 |