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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.11110 |
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| _version_ | 1866909313832845312 |
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| author | Alvim, Mário S. Fernandes, Natasha McIver, Annabelle Morgan, Carroll Nunes, Gabriel H. |
| author_facet | Alvim, Mário S. Fernandes, Natasha McIver, Annabelle Morgan, Carroll Nunes, Gabriel H. |
| contents | We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines -- that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al., to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2308_11110 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow Alvim, Mário S. Fernandes, Natasha McIver, Annabelle Morgan, Carroll Nunes, Gabriel H. Cryptography and Security We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines -- that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al., to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs. |
| title | A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.11110 |