Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866916097386610688 |
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| author | Neu, Joachim Tas, Ertem Nusret Tse, David |
| author_facet | Neu, Joachim Tas, Ertem Nusret Tse, David |
| contents | Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2308_16902 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality Neu, Joachim Tas, Ertem Nusret Tse, David Cryptography and Security Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results. |
| title | Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.16902 |