Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| _version_ | 1866909080985010176 |
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| author | Wang, Weiyi Jiao, Yutao Chen, Jin Dai, Wenting Kang, Jiawen Xu, Yuhua |
| author_facet | Wang, Weiyi Jiao, Yutao Chen, Jin Dai, Wenting Kang, Jiawen Xu, Yuhua |
| contents | In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained complex wireless network. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for relay and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation sub-auction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes choose transactions based rewards to forward. Besides, relay nodes adjust the relaying probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). We also derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and bandwidth resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2309_01920 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network Wang, Weiyi Jiao, Yutao Chen, Jin Dai, Wenting Kang, Jiawen Xu, Yuhua Networking and Internet Architecture Computer Science and Game Theory In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained complex wireless network. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for relay and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation sub-auction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes choose transactions based rewards to forward. Besides, relay nodes adjust the relaying probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). We also derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and bandwidth resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network. |
| title | Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network |
| topic | Networking and Internet Architecture Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.01920 |