Cover Image

Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Freeman, Rupert, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms
by: de Berg, Mark, et al.
Published: (2024)

Social Welfare in Budget Aggregation
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2026)

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality
by: Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike, et al.
Published: (2025)

Anonymous and Copy-Robust Delegations for Liquid Democracy
by: Utke, Markus, et al.
Published: (2023)

Robust Committee Voting, or The Other Side of Representation
by: Kehne, Gregory, et al.
Published: (2025)

On Multi-Level Apportionment
by: Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike, et al.
Published: (2025)

Condorcet Dimension and Pareto Optimality for Matchings and Beyond
by: Kavitha, Telikepalli, et al.
Published: (2026)

On the Efficiency of Fair and Truthful Trade Mechanisms
by: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Published: (2025)

Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools
by: Zahedi, Seyed Majid, et al.
Published: (2026)

Harm Ratio: A Novel and Versatile Fairness Criterion
by: Ebadian, Soroush, et al.
Published: (2024)

Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)

Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations
by: Avramidis, Dimitris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
by: Montanari, Luisa, et al.
Published: (2022)

Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting
by: Han, Qishen, et al.
Published: (2026)

Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond
by: Tao, Biaoshuai, et al.
Published: (2023)

A Participatory Budgeting based Truthful Budget-Limited Incentive Mechanism for Time-Constrained Tasks in Crowdsensing Systems
by: Bhargavi, Chattu, et al.
Published: (2024)

City Sampling for Citizens' Assemblies
by: Gölz, Paul, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2024)

Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
by: Liaw, Christopher, et al.
Published: (2023)

Truthful Fair Division under Stochastic Valuations
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2026)

Asymptotically Fair and Truthful Allocation of Public Goods
by: Kananian, Pouya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fair and Truthful Allocations Under Leveled Valuations
by: Christodoulou, George, et al.
Published: (2024)

Plant-and-Steal: Truthful Fair Allocations via Predictions
by: Cohen, Ilan Reuven, et al.
Published: (2024)

What Are People's Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation?
by: Amster, Ayelet, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences
by: Hirvonen, Juho, et al.
Published: (2024)

Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting
by: Boehmer, Niclas, et al.
Published: (2023)

Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Projects Interaction
by: Fairstein, Roy, et al.
Published: (2021)

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2024)

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation
by: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Published: (2026)

On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
by: Shan, Liang, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities on Budgets
by: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Price of Justified Representation
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2021)

Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candidate Control
by: Faliszewski, Piotr, et al.
Published: (2026)

Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games
by: Becker, Patrick, et al.
Published: (2025)

No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Monotone Randomized Apportionment
by: Correa, José, et al.
Published: (2024)

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
by: Amanatidis, Georgios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Information Propagation with Budgets
by: Zheng, Junjie, et al.
Published: (2024)

Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising
by: Soumalias, Ermis, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)