Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866929276916334592 |
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| author | Steg, Jan-Henrik Garashli, Elshan Greinecker, Michael Kuzmics, Christoph |
| author_facet | Steg, Jan-Henrik Garashli, Elshan Greinecker, Michael Kuzmics, Christoph |
| contents | For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2309_04193 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives Steg, Jan-Henrik Garashli, Elshan Greinecker, Michael Kuzmics, Christoph Theoretical Economics 91A28 For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium. |
| title | Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A28 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.04193 |