Cover Image

Truthful Interval Covering

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Deligkas, Argyrios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Approximate-EFX Allocations with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2025)

Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2026)

Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Distortion of Stable Matching
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2026)

A Theoretical Approach to Stablecoin Design via Price Windows
by: Molinet, Katherine, et al.
Published: (2026)

On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2024)

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2025)

Approximate Envy-Free Allocations up to any $k$ Goods
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Proportionality Degree in Participatory Budgeting
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric First-Price Auctions
by: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
by: Amanatidis, Georgios, et al.
Published: (2024)

Truthful Facility Location with Candidate Locations and Limited Resources
by: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Published: (2025)

Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences
by: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Published: (2024)

On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes
by: Amanatidis, Georgios, et al.
Published: (2023)

Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations
by: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Published: (2023)

Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2026)

Constant Inapproximability for PPA
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2022)

Fisher Markets with Approximately Optimal Bundles and the Need for a PCP Theorem for PPAD
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2026)

Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPAD
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2022)

Metric Distortion of Obnoxious Distributed Voting
by: Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Published: (2024)

The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2023)

The Distortion of Threshold Approval Matching
by: Latifian, Mohamad, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Price of EF1 for Few Agents with Additive Ternary Valuations
by: Kyropoulou, Maria, et al.
Published: (2025)

Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Diversity-seeking Jump Games in Networks
by: Narayanan, Lata, et al.
Published: (2023)

Stability in Distance Preservation Games on Graphs
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2026)

Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Individual Rationality in Topological Distance Games is Surprisingly Hard
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2024)

Variety-Seeking Jump Games on Graphs
by: Narayanan, Lata, et al.
Published: (2025)

Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives
by: Amanatidis, Georgios, et al.
Published: (2024)

EF1 and EFX Orientations
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2024)

Truthful Fair Division under Stochastic Valuations
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2026)

Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness
by: Deligkas, Argyris, et al.
Published: (2025)

Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting
by: Han, Qishen, et al.
Published: (2026)

Interval Scheduling Games
by: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran, et al.
Published: (2026)

Quickest Detection of Adversarial Attacks Against Correlated Equilibria
by: Kazari, Kiarash, et al.
Published: (2025)

On the Efficiency of Fair and Truthful Trade Mechanisms
by: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Published: (2025)