Social \textit{vs.} individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| _version_ | 1866909214963662848 |
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| author | Chalub, Fabio A. C. C. Doutor, Paulo Patrício, Paula Soares, Maria do Céu |
| author_facet | Chalub, Fabio A. C. C. Doutor, Paulo Patrício, Paula Soares, Maria do Céu |
| contents | In diseases with long-term immunity, vaccination is known to increase the average age at infection as a result of the decrease in the pathogen circulation. This implies that a vaccination campaign can have negative effects when a disease is more costly (financial or health-related costs) for higher ages. This work considers an age-structured population transmission model with imperfect vaccination. We aim to compare the social and individual costs of vaccination, assuming that disease costs are age-dependent, while the disease's dynamic is age-independent. A model coupling pathogen deterministic dynamics for a population consisting of juveniles and adults, assumed to be rational agents, is introduced. The parameter region for which vaccination has a positive social impact is fully characterized and the Nash equilibrium of the vaccination game is obtained. Finally, collective strategies designed to promote voluntary vaccination, without compromising social welfare, are discussed. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2309_06336 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Social \textit{vs.} individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination Chalub, Fabio A. C. C. Doutor, Paulo Patrício, Paula Soares, Maria do Céu Populations and Evolution 92D30, 91A99, 34A34 In diseases with long-term immunity, vaccination is known to increase the average age at infection as a result of the decrease in the pathogen circulation. This implies that a vaccination campaign can have negative effects when a disease is more costly (financial or health-related costs) for higher ages. This work considers an age-structured population transmission model with imperfect vaccination. We aim to compare the social and individual costs of vaccination, assuming that disease costs are age-dependent, while the disease's dynamic is age-independent. A model coupling pathogen deterministic dynamics for a population consisting of juveniles and adults, assumed to be rational agents, is introduced. The parameter region for which vaccination has a positive social impact is fully characterized and the Nash equilibrium of the vaccination game is obtained. Finally, collective strategies designed to promote voluntary vaccination, without compromising social welfare, are discussed. |
| title | Social \textit{vs.} individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination |
| topic | Populations and Evolution 92D30, 91A99, 34A34 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.06336 |