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Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Bacchiocchi, Francesco, Castiglioni, Matteo, Marchesi, Alberto, Gatti, Nicola
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2023
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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