Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Cao, Bochuan, Cao, Yuanpu, Lin, Lu, Chen, Jinghui
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
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author Cao, Bochuan
Cao, Yuanpu
Lin, Lu
Chen, Jinghui
author_facet Cao, Bochuan
Cao, Yuanpu
Lin, Lu
Chen, Jinghui
contents Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant advancements and are now widely used across various domains. Unfortunately, there has been a rising concern that LLMs can be misused to generate harmful or malicious content. Though a line of research has focused on aligning LLMs with human values and preventing them from producing inappropriate content, such alignments are usually vulnerable and can be bypassed by alignment-breaking attacks via adversarially optimized or handcrafted jailbreaking prompts. In this work, we introduce a Robustly Aligned LLM (RA-LLM) to defend against potential alignment-breaking attacks. RA-LLM can be directly constructed upon an existing aligned LLM with a robust alignment checking function, without requiring any expensive retraining or fine-tuning process of the original LLM. Furthermore, we also provide a theoretical analysis for RA-LLM to verify its effectiveness in defending against alignment-breaking attacks. Through real-world experiments on open-source large language models, we demonstrate that RA-LLM can successfully defend against both state-of-the-art adversarial prompts and popular handcrafted jailbreaking prompts by reducing their attack success rates from nearly 100% to around 10% or less.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2309_14348
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM
Cao, Bochuan
Cao, Yuanpu
Lin, Lu
Chen, Jinghui
Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant advancements and are now widely used across various domains. Unfortunately, there has been a rising concern that LLMs can be misused to generate harmful or malicious content. Though a line of research has focused on aligning LLMs with human values and preventing them from producing inappropriate content, such alignments are usually vulnerable and can be bypassed by alignment-breaking attacks via adversarially optimized or handcrafted jailbreaking prompts. In this work, we introduce a Robustly Aligned LLM (RA-LLM) to defend against potential alignment-breaking attacks. RA-LLM can be directly constructed upon an existing aligned LLM with a robust alignment checking function, without requiring any expensive retraining or fine-tuning process of the original LLM. Furthermore, we also provide a theoretical analysis for RA-LLM to verify its effectiveness in defending against alignment-breaking attacks. Through real-world experiments on open-source large language models, we demonstrate that RA-LLM can successfully defend against both state-of-the-art adversarial prompts and popular handcrafted jailbreaking prompts by reducing their attack success rates from nearly 100% to around 10% or less.
title Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM
topic Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.14348