Source-Replacement Model for Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866910581694398464 |
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| author | Huang, Yizhi Du, Zhenyu Ma, Xiongfeng |
| author_facet | Huang, Yizhi Du, Zhenyu Ma, Xiongfeng |
| contents | Quantum key distribution has emerged as a promising solution for constructing secure communication networks, offering information-theoretic security guaranteed by the principles of quantum mechanics. One of the most advanced quantum key distribution protocols to date is the phase-matching protocol. Its security was initially established using an abstract method known as symmetry-protected privacy. In this study, we reevaluate the security of the phase-matching protocol using an intuitive source-replacement model, and we arrive at conclusions that align with the original proof. This model provides a fresh perspective on the protocol's security. As an application of this approach, we introduce a beam-splitting attack scheme. Leveraging the source-replacement model, we derive a lower bound on the phase error rate under this attack, further underscoring the robustness of our security analysis method. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2309_17304 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Source-Replacement Model for Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution Huang, Yizhi Du, Zhenyu Ma, Xiongfeng Quantum Physics Quantum key distribution has emerged as a promising solution for constructing secure communication networks, offering information-theoretic security guaranteed by the principles of quantum mechanics. One of the most advanced quantum key distribution protocols to date is the phase-matching protocol. Its security was initially established using an abstract method known as symmetry-protected privacy. In this study, we reevaluate the security of the phase-matching protocol using an intuitive source-replacement model, and we arrive at conclusions that align with the original proof. This model provides a fresh perspective on the protocol's security. As an application of this approach, we introduce a beam-splitting attack scheme. Leveraging the source-replacement model, we derive a lower bound on the phase error rate under this attack, further underscoring the robustness of our security analysis method. |
| title | Source-Replacement Model for Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.17304 |