Resolving a Clearing Member's Default, A Radner Equilibrium Approach

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Bastide, Dorinel, Crépey, Stéphane, Drapeau, Samuel, Tadese, Mekonnen
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
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author Bastide, Dorinel
Crépey, Stéphane
Drapeau, Samuel
Tadese, Mekonnen
author_facet Bastide, Dorinel
Crépey, Stéphane
Drapeau, Samuel
Tadese, Mekonnen
contents For vanilla derivatives that constitute the bulk of investment banks' hedging portfolios, central clearing through central counterparties (CCPs) has become hegemonic. A key mandate of a CCP is to provide an efficient and proper clearing member default resolution procedure. When a clearing member defaults, the CCP can hedge and auction or liquidate its positions. The counterparty credit risk cost of auctioning has been analyzed in terms of XVA metrics in Bastide, Cr{é}pey, Drapeau, and Tadese (2023). In this work we assess the costs of hedging or liquidating. This is done by comparing pre- and post-default market equilibria, using a Radner equilibrium approach for portfolio allocation and price discovery in each case. We show that the Radner equilibria uniquely exist and we provide both analytical and numerical solutions for the latter in elliptically distributed markets. Using such tools, a CCP could decide rationally on which market to hedge and auction or liquidate defaulted portfolios.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_02608
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Resolving a Clearing Member's Default, A Radner Equilibrium Approach
Bastide, Dorinel
Crépey, Stéphane
Drapeau, Samuel
Tadese, Mekonnen
Risk Management
For vanilla derivatives that constitute the bulk of investment banks' hedging portfolios, central clearing through central counterparties (CCPs) has become hegemonic. A key mandate of a CCP is to provide an efficient and proper clearing member default resolution procedure. When a clearing member defaults, the CCP can hedge and auction or liquidate its positions. The counterparty credit risk cost of auctioning has been analyzed in terms of XVA metrics in Bastide, Cr{é}pey, Drapeau, and Tadese (2023). In this work we assess the costs of hedging or liquidating. This is done by comparing pre- and post-default market equilibria, using a Radner equilibrium approach for portfolio allocation and price discovery in each case. We show that the Radner equilibria uniquely exist and we provide both analytical and numerical solutions for the latter in elliptically distributed markets. Using such tools, a CCP could decide rationally on which market to hedge and auction or liquidate defaulted portfolios.
title Resolving a Clearing Member's Default, A Radner Equilibrium Approach
topic Risk Management
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02608