Matching with Generalized Sequential Choice Rules
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911359215599616 |
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| author | Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan |
| author_facet | Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan |
| contents | This paper studies a many-to-one matching between individuals and institutions where institutions comprise multiple divisions and face cross-divisional constraints. We introduce a parametrized family of choice rules, which we call generalized sequential (GSq), that encompasses many different choice rules encountered in practice and in market design literature. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in a matching problem where all institutions have a GSq choice rule. We present two real-world applications in which choice rules in the GSq family emerge naturally: affirmative action in India's public higher educational institutions and government jobs, and high school admissions in China. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_02660 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Matching with Generalized Sequential Choice Rules Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan Theoretical Economics This paper studies a many-to-one matching between individuals and institutions where institutions comprise multiple divisions and face cross-divisional constraints. We introduce a parametrized family of choice rules, which we call generalized sequential (GSq), that encompasses many different choice rules encountered in practice and in market design literature. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in a matching problem where all institutions have a GSq choice rule. We present two real-world applications in which choice rules in the GSq family emerge naturally: affirmative action in India's public higher educational institutions and government jobs, and high school admissions in China. |
| title | Matching with Generalized Sequential Choice Rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02660 |