Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866909570322923520 |
|---|---|
| author | Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin |
| author_facet | Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin |
| contents | In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that, when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-optimal for a zero-cost seller. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_03692 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that, when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-optimal for a zero-cost seller. |
| title | Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03692 |