Operating-Envelopes-Aware Decentralized Welfare Maximization for Energy Communities
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866929330920095744 |
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| author | Alahmed, Ahmed S. Cavraro, Guido Bernstein, Andrey Tong, Lang |
| author_facet | Alahmed, Ahmed S. Cavraro, Guido Bernstein, Andrey Tong, Lang |
| contents | We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources and transacts with a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) under a generalized net energy metering tariff design. To ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, we propose an incentive-aligned community pricing mechanism under which the decentralized optimization of community members' benefit implies the optimization of overall community welfare. The proposed pricing mechanism satisfies the cost-causation principle and ensures the stability of the energy community in a coalition game setting. Numerical examples provide insights into the characteristics of the proposed pricing mechanism and quantitative measures of its performance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_07157 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Operating-Envelopes-Aware Decentralized Welfare Maximization for Energy Communities Alahmed, Ahmed S. Cavraro, Guido Bernstein, Andrey Tong, Lang Systems and Control Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources and transacts with a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) under a generalized net energy metering tariff design. To ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, we propose an incentive-aligned community pricing mechanism under which the decentralized optimization of community members' benefit implies the optimization of overall community welfare. The proposed pricing mechanism satisfies the cost-causation principle and ensures the stability of the energy community in a coalition game setting. Numerical examples provide insights into the characteristics of the proposed pricing mechanism and quantitative measures of its performance. |
| title | Operating-Envelopes-Aware Decentralized Welfare Maximization for Energy Communities |
| topic | Systems and Control Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.07157 |