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Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Liaw, Christopher, Mehta, Aranyak, Zhu, Wennan
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2023
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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