Watch Nearby! Privacy Analysis of the People Nearby Service of Telegram
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866917764603576320 |
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| author | Caprolu, Maurantonio Sciancalepore, Savio Grigorov, Aleksandar Kolev, Velyan Oligeri, Gabriele |
| author_facet | Caprolu, Maurantonio Sciancalepore, Savio Grigorov, Aleksandar Kolev, Velyan Oligeri, Gabriele |
| contents | People Nearby is a service offered by Telegram that allows a user to discover other Telegram users, based only on geographical proximity. Nearby users are reported with a rough estimate of their distance from the position of the reference user, allowing Telegram to claim location privacy In this paper, we systematically analyze the location privacy provided by Telegram to users of the People Nearby service. Through an extensive measurement campaign run by spoofing the user's location all over the world, we reverse-engineer the algorithm adopted by People Nearby to compute distances between users. Although the service protects against precise user localization, we demonstrate that location privacy is always lower than the one declared by Telegram of 500 meters. Specifically, we discover that location privacy is a function of the geographical position of the user. Indeed, the radius of the location privacy area (localization error) spans between 400 meters (close to the equator) and 128 meters (close to the poles), with a difference of up to 75% (worst case) compared to what Telegram declares. After our responsible disclosure, Telegram updated the FAQ associated with the service. Finally, we provide some solutions and countermeasures that Telegram can implement to improve location privacy. In general, the reported findings highlight the significant privacy risks associated with using People Nearby service. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_13528 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Watch Nearby! Privacy Analysis of the People Nearby Service of Telegram Caprolu, Maurantonio Sciancalepore, Savio Grigorov, Aleksandar Kolev, Velyan Oligeri, Gabriele Cryptography and Security People Nearby is a service offered by Telegram that allows a user to discover other Telegram users, based only on geographical proximity. Nearby users are reported with a rough estimate of their distance from the position of the reference user, allowing Telegram to claim location privacy In this paper, we systematically analyze the location privacy provided by Telegram to users of the People Nearby service. Through an extensive measurement campaign run by spoofing the user's location all over the world, we reverse-engineer the algorithm adopted by People Nearby to compute distances between users. Although the service protects against precise user localization, we demonstrate that location privacy is always lower than the one declared by Telegram of 500 meters. Specifically, we discover that location privacy is a function of the geographical position of the user. Indeed, the radius of the location privacy area (localization error) spans between 400 meters (close to the equator) and 128 meters (close to the poles), with a difference of up to 75% (worst case) compared to what Telegram declares. After our responsible disclosure, Telegram updated the FAQ associated with the service. Finally, we provide some solutions and countermeasures that Telegram can implement to improve location privacy. In general, the reported findings highlight the significant privacy risks associated with using People Nearby service. |
| title | Watch Nearby! Privacy Analysis of the People Nearby Service of Telegram |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.13528 |