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Towards Realistic Mechanisms That Incentivize Federated Participation and Contribution

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bornstein, Marco, Bedi, Amrit Singh, Sahu, Anit Kumar, Khan, Furqan, Huang, Furong
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Computers and Society Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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