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Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Cembrano, Javier, Griesbach, Svenja M., Stahlberg, Maximilian J.
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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