Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| _version_ | 1866929304465571840 |
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| author | Zhu, Wenqiang Wang, Xin Wang, Chaoqian Liu, Longzhao Zheng, Hongwei Tang, Shaoting |
| author_facet | Zhu, Wenqiang Wang, Xin Wang, Chaoqian Liu, Longzhao Zheng, Hongwei Tang, Shaoting |
| contents | A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperations and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_15488 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation Zhu, Wenqiang Wang, Xin Wang, Chaoqian Liu, Longzhao Zheng, Hongwei Tang, Shaoting Physics and Society Populations and Evolution A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperations and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups. |
| title | Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation |
| topic | Physics and Society Populations and Evolution |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.15488 |