On the matrix code of quadratic relationships for a Goppa code

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mora, Rocco
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866911961257607168
author Mora, Rocco
author_facet Mora, Rocco
contents In this article, we continue the analysis started in \cite{CMT23} for the matrix code of quadratic relationships associated with a Goppa code. We provide new sparse and low-rank elements in the matrix code and categorize them according to their shape. Thanks to this description, we prove that the set of rank 2 matrices in the matrix codes associated with square-free binary Goppa codes, i.e. those used in Classic McEiece, is much larger than what is expected, at least in the case where the Goppa polynomial degree is 2. We build upon the algebraic determinantal modeling introduced in \cite{CMT23} to derive a structural attack on these instances. Our method can break in just a few seconds some recent challenges about key-recovery attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem, consistently reducing their estimated security level. We also provide a general method, valid for any Goppa polynomial degree, to transform a generic pair of support and multiplier into a pair of support and Goppa polynomial.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2310_20497
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On the matrix code of quadratic relationships for a Goppa code
Mora, Rocco
Information Theory
Cryptography and Security
In this article, we continue the analysis started in \cite{CMT23} for the matrix code of quadratic relationships associated with a Goppa code. We provide new sparse and low-rank elements in the matrix code and categorize them according to their shape. Thanks to this description, we prove that the set of rank 2 matrices in the matrix codes associated with square-free binary Goppa codes, i.e. those used in Classic McEiece, is much larger than what is expected, at least in the case where the Goppa polynomial degree is 2. We build upon the algebraic determinantal modeling introduced in \cite{CMT23} to derive a structural attack on these instances. Our method can break in just a few seconds some recent challenges about key-recovery attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem, consistently reducing their estimated security level. We also provide a general method, valid for any Goppa polynomial degree, to transform a generic pair of support and multiplier into a pair of support and Goppa polynomial.
title On the matrix code of quadratic relationships for a Goppa code
topic Information Theory
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.20497