Magmaw: Modality-Agnostic Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Wireless Communication Systems
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866915028081311744 |
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| author | Chang, Jung-Woo Sun, Ke Heydaribeni, Nasimeh Hidano, Seira Zhang, Xinyu Koushanfar, Farinaz |
| author_facet | Chang, Jung-Woo Sun, Ke Heydaribeni, Nasimeh Hidano, Seira Zhang, Xinyu Koushanfar, Farinaz |
| contents | Machine Learning (ML) has been instrumental in enabling joint transceiver optimization by merging all physical layer blocks of the end-to-end wireless communication systems. Although there have been a number of adversarial attacks on ML-based wireless systems, the existing methods do not provide a comprehensive view including multi-modality of the source data, common physical layer protocols, and wireless domain constraints. This paper proposes Magmaw, a novel wireless attack methodology capable of generating universal adversarial perturbations for any multimodal signal transmitted over a wireless channel. We further introduce new objectives for adversarial attacks on downstream applications. We adopt the widely-used defenses to verify the resilience of Magmaw. For proof-of-concept evaluation, we build a real-time wireless attack platform using a software-defined radio system. Experimental results demonstrate that Magmaw causes significant performance degradation even in the presence of strong defense mechanisms. Furthermore, we validate the performance of Magmaw in two case studies: encrypted communication channel and channel modality-based ML model. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2311_00207 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Magmaw: Modality-Agnostic Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Wireless Communication Systems Chang, Jung-Woo Sun, Ke Heydaribeni, Nasimeh Hidano, Seira Zhang, Xinyu Koushanfar, Farinaz Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning (ML) has been instrumental in enabling joint transceiver optimization by merging all physical layer blocks of the end-to-end wireless communication systems. Although there have been a number of adversarial attacks on ML-based wireless systems, the existing methods do not provide a comprehensive view including multi-modality of the source data, common physical layer protocols, and wireless domain constraints. This paper proposes Magmaw, a novel wireless attack methodology capable of generating universal adversarial perturbations for any multimodal signal transmitted over a wireless channel. We further introduce new objectives for adversarial attacks on downstream applications. We adopt the widely-used defenses to verify the resilience of Magmaw. For proof-of-concept evaluation, we build a real-time wireless attack platform using a software-defined radio system. Experimental results demonstrate that Magmaw causes significant performance degradation even in the presence of strong defense mechanisms. Furthermore, we validate the performance of Magmaw in two case studies: encrypted communication channel and channel modality-based ML model. |
| title | Magmaw: Modality-Agnostic Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Wireless Communication Systems |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.00207 |