Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866910583177084928 |
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| author | Gallo, Oihane Klaus, Bettina |
| author_facet | Gallo, Oihane Klaus, Bettina |
| contents | We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $θ$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL).For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) $θ$-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by $θ$-size coalitions. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2311_03950 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems Gallo, Oihane Klaus, Bettina Theoretical Economics We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $θ$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL).For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) $θ$-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by $θ$-size coalitions. |
| title | Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03950 |