Collective Sampling: An Ex Ante Perspective
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910746220167168 |
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| author | Zhou, Yangfan |
| author_facet | Zhou, Yangfan |
| contents | I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a methodology to characterize equilibria using an ex ante perspective. Instead of stopping strategies, players choose distributions over posterior beliefs subject to majorization constraints. Equilibrium sampling regions are characterized via a fixed-point argument based on concavification. Collective sampling generates learning inefficiencies and having more decisive coalitions typically reduces learning. I apply the model to committee search and competition in persuasion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2311_05758 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Collective Sampling: An Ex Ante Perspective Zhou, Yangfan Theoretical Economics I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a methodology to characterize equilibria using an ex ante perspective. Instead of stopping strategies, players choose distributions over posterior beliefs subject to majorization constraints. Equilibrium sampling regions are characterized via a fixed-point argument based on concavification. Collective sampling generates learning inefficiencies and having more decisive coalitions typically reduces learning. I apply the model to committee search and competition in persuasion. |
| title | Collective Sampling: An Ex Ante Perspective |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.05758 |