Triad: Trusted Timestamps in Untrusted Environments
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866910342866534400 |
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| author | Fernandez, Gabriel P. Brito, Andrey Fetzer, Christof |
| author_facet | Fernandez, Gabriel P. Brito, Andrey Fetzer, Christof |
| contents | We aim to provide trusted time measurement mechanisms to applications and cloud infrastructure deployed in environments that could harbor potential adversaries, including the hardware infrastructure provider. Despite Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) providing multiple security functionalities, timestamps from the Operating System are not covered. Nevertheless, some services require time for validating permissions or ordering events. To address that need, we introduce Triad, a trusted timestamp dispatcher of time readings. The solution provides trusted timestamps enforced by mutually supportive enclave-based clock servers that create a continuous trusted timeline. We leverage enclave properties such as forced exits and CPU-based counters to mitigate attacks on the server's timestamp counters. Triad produces trusted, confidential, monotonically-increasing timestamps with bounded error and desirable, non-trivial properties. Our implementation relies on Intel SGX and SCONE, allowing transparent usage. We evaluate Triad's error and behavior in multiple dimensions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2311_06156 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Triad: Trusted Timestamps in Untrusted Environments Fernandez, Gabriel P. Brito, Andrey Fetzer, Christof Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing We aim to provide trusted time measurement mechanisms to applications and cloud infrastructure deployed in environments that could harbor potential adversaries, including the hardware infrastructure provider. Despite Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) providing multiple security functionalities, timestamps from the Operating System are not covered. Nevertheless, some services require time for validating permissions or ordering events. To address that need, we introduce Triad, a trusted timestamp dispatcher of time readings. The solution provides trusted timestamps enforced by mutually supportive enclave-based clock servers that create a continuous trusted timeline. We leverage enclave properties such as forced exits and CPU-based counters to mitigate attacks on the server's timestamp counters. Triad produces trusted, confidential, monotonically-increasing timestamps with bounded error and desirable, non-trivial properties. Our implementation relies on Intel SGX and SCONE, allowing transparent usage. We evaluate Triad's error and behavior in multiple dimensions. |
| title | Triad: Trusted Timestamps in Untrusted Environments |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.06156 |