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The Multi-BMBY Mechanism: Proportionality-Preserving and Strategyproof Ownership Restructuring in Private Companies

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Danino, Gal, Koren, Moran, Madmon, Omer
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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