Crypto analysis of the key distribution scheme using noise-free resistances
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866913243264450560 |
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| author | Kish, Laszlo B. |
| author_facet | Kish, Laszlo B. |
| contents | Known key exchange schemes offering information-theoretic (unconditional) security are complex and costly to implement. Nonetheless, they remain the only known methods for achieving unconditional security in key exchange. Therefore, the explorations for simpler solutions for information-theoretic security are highly justified. Lin et al. [1] proposed an interesting hardware key distribution scheme that utilizes thermal-noise-free resistances and DC voltages.
A crypto analysis of this system is presented. It is shown that, if Eve gains access to the initial shared secret at any time in the past or future, she can successfully crack all the generated keys in the past and future, even retroactively, using passively obtained and recorded voltages and currents. Therefore, the scheme is not a secure key exchanger, but it is rather a key expander with no more information entropy than the originally shared secret at the beginning.
We also point out that the proposed defense methods against active attacks do not function when the original shared secret is compromised because then the communication cannot be efficiently authenticated. However, they do work when an unconditionally secure key exchanger is applied to enable the authenticated communication protocol. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2312_00031 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Crypto analysis of the key distribution scheme using noise-free resistances Kish, Laszlo B. Cryptography and Security Emerging Technologies Known key exchange schemes offering information-theoretic (unconditional) security are complex and costly to implement. Nonetheless, they remain the only known methods for achieving unconditional security in key exchange. Therefore, the explorations for simpler solutions for information-theoretic security are highly justified. Lin et al. [1] proposed an interesting hardware key distribution scheme that utilizes thermal-noise-free resistances and DC voltages. A crypto analysis of this system is presented. It is shown that, if Eve gains access to the initial shared secret at any time in the past or future, she can successfully crack all the generated keys in the past and future, even retroactively, using passively obtained and recorded voltages and currents. Therefore, the scheme is not a secure key exchanger, but it is rather a key expander with no more information entropy than the originally shared secret at the beginning. We also point out that the proposed defense methods against active attacks do not function when the original shared secret is compromised because then the communication cannot be efficiently authenticated. However, they do work when an unconditionally secure key exchanger is applied to enable the authenticated communication protocol. |
| title | Crypto analysis of the key distribution scheme using noise-free resistances |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Emerging Technologies |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.00031 |