Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866929544258125824 |
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| author | Landis, Daji |
| author_facet | Landis, Daji |
| contents | Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that shows that the incentives are not aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2312_01549 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups Landis, Daji Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that shows that the incentives are not aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model. |
| title | Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01549 |