Multiplayer boycotts in convex games
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866914638859337728 |
|---|---|
| author | Fokkink, Robbert de Munnik, Hans |
| author_facet | Fokkink, Robbert de Munnik, Hans |
| contents | We extend the notion of boycotts in cooperative games from one-on-one boycotts between single players to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying the impact of boycotts. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2312_13700 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Multiplayer boycotts in convex games Fokkink, Robbert de Munnik, Hans Computer Science and Game Theory 91A12 We extend the notion of boycotts in cooperative games from one-on-one boycotts between single players to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying the impact of boycotts. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott. |
| title | Multiplayer boycotts in convex games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory 91A12 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.13700 |