An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | Holliday, Wesley H., Pacuit, Eric |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
Characterizations of voting rules based on majority margins
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2025)
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2022)
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2024)
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2024)
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2021)
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2021)
Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2025)
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2025)
The incompatibility of the Condorcet winner and loser criteria with positive involvement and resolvability
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2026)
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2026)
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2024)
Stable Voting and the Splitting of Cycles
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2025)
Majoritarian Assignment Rules
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2026)
A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties
by: Hou, Fujun
Published: (2024)
by: Hou, Fujun
Published: (2024)
Nash Welfare in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
by: Pagano, Marta, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Pagano, Marta, et al.
Published: (2026)
The Polarization Effect of Monopsonistic Lobbying
by: Shum, Peter
Published: (2025)
by: Shum, Peter
Published: (2025)
Manipulation of social choice correspondences under incomplete information
by: Berzi, Raffaele, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Berzi, Raffaele, et al.
Published: (2025)
Extended Scenario Bundle Analysis: A Formal Framework for Strategic Scenario Modeling
by: Pitz, Thomas, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Pitz, Thomas, et al.
Published: (2026)
Correlated optimin
by: Seven, Mehmet Mars
Published: (2026)
by: Seven, Mehmet Mars
Published: (2026)
A characterization of strategy-proof probabilistic assignment rules
by: Donthu, Sai Praneeth, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Donthu, Sai Praneeth, et al.
Published: (2025)
On Probabilistic Assignment Rules
by: Gogulapati, Sreedurga, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Gogulapati, Sreedurga, et al.
Published: (2025)
Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds May Suffice
by: Gersbach, Hans, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Gersbach, Hans, et al.
Published: (2024)
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
by: Basile, Achille, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Basile, Achille, et al.
Published: (2022)
Revisiting the Unitary Actor Assumption: Toward Realistic Aggregation of Individual Preferences in Strategy Research
by: Csaszar, Felipe A., et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Csaszar, Felipe A., et al.
Published: (2026)
An Axiomatic Theory of Tie-Breaking: Impossibility, Characterization, and Decomposition
by: Feys, Frank M. V.
Published: (2026)
by: Feys, Frank M. V.
Published: (2026)
PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection
by: Lyon, Harper, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Lyon, Harper, et al.
Published: (2026)
Analyzing the Effects of Two-Stage Peer Evaluation
by: Fairstein, Roy, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Fairstein, Roy, et al.
Published: (2026)
Cohesion-Sensitive Power Indices: Representation Results for Banzhaf and Shapley Values
by: Pitz, Thomas, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Pitz, Thomas, et al.
Published: (2026)
BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs
by: Todd, Jason Douglas, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Todd, Jason Douglas, et al.
Published: (2026)
Metric geometry for ranking-based voting: Tools for learning electoral structure
by: Duchin, Moon, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Duchin, Moon, et al.
Published: (2026)
Tight Guarantees in the Commons
by: Bogomolnaia, Anna, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Bogomolnaia, Anna, et al.
Published: (2024)
Bargaining via Weber's law
by: Bardakhchyan, V. G., et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Bardakhchyan, V. G., et al.
Published: (2024)
Efficient Defection: Overage-Proportional Rationing Attains the Cooperative Frontier
by: Lengyel, Florian
Published: (2025)
by: Lengyel, Florian
Published: (2025)
The Simplicity of Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms
by: Correa, Jose, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Correa, Jose, et al.
Published: (2024)
Optimistic and pessimistic approaches for cooperative games
by: Atay, Ata, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Atay, Ata, et al.
Published: (2024)
Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, State-Salient Decision Rules and the Strict Condorcet Choice Function
by: Lahiri, Somdeb
Published: (2025)
by: Lahiri, Somdeb
Published: (2025)
A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit
by: Sewell, Roger F.
Published: (2025)
by: Sewell, Roger F.
Published: (2025)
Vocabulary aggregation
by: LiCalzi, Marco, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: LiCalzi, Marco, et al.
Published: (2026)
The Coordination Gap: Multi-Agent Alternation Metrics for Temporal Fairness in Repeated Games
by: Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Al., et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Al., et al.
Published: (2026)
Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis
by: Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, et al.
Published: (2023)
The Geometry of Cooperative Game Solutions: Stratified Egalitarian Shapley Values
by: Feys, Frank M. V.
Published: (2026)
by: Feys, Frank M. V.
Published: (2026)
Super-Nash Performance
by: Ismail, Mehmet S.
Published: (2019)
by: Ismail, Mehmet S.
Published: (2019)
Quantitative Relaxations of Arrow's Axioms
by: Sana, Suvadip, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Sana, Suvadip, et al.
Published: (2025)
Majority voting is not good for heaven or hell, with mirrored performance
by: Chebotarev, Pavel, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Chebotarev, Pavel, et al.
Published: (2023)
Similar Items
-
Characterizations of voting rules based on majority margins
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2025) -
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
by: Ding, Yifeng, et al.
Published: (2022) -
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2024) -
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
by: Holliday, Wesley H., et al.
Published: (2021) -
Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
by: Holliday, Wesley H.
Published: (2025)