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Main Authors: Vaishnav, Vaibhav, Jain, Anoop, Sharma, Dushyant
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.00180
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author Vaishnav, Vaibhav
Jain, Anoop
Sharma, Dushyant
author_facet Vaishnav, Vaibhav
Jain, Anoop
Sharma, Dushyant
contents This paper proposes a cyber-resilient distributed control strategy equipped with attack detection capabilities for islanded AC microgrids in the presence of bounded stealthy cyber attacks affecting both frequency and power information exchanged among neighboring distributed generators (DGs). The proposed control methodology relies on the construction of an auxiliary layer and the establishment of effective inter-layer cooperation between the actual DGs in the control layer and the virtual DGs in the auxiliary layer. This cooperation aims to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing. It is shown that the in situ presence of a concealed auxiliary layer not only guarantees resilience against stealthy bounded attacks on both frequency and power-sharing but also facilitates a network-enabled attack identification mechanism. The paper provides rigorous proof of the stability of the closed-loop system and derives bounds for frequency and power deviations under attack conditions, offering insights into the impact of the attack signal, control and pinning gains, and network connectivity on the system's convergence properties. The performance of the proposed controllers is illustrated by simulating a networked islanded AC microgrid in a Simulink environment showcasing both attributes of attack resilience and attack detection.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_00180
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Auxiliary Network-Enabled Attack Detection and Resilient Control of Islanded AC Microgrid
Vaishnav, Vaibhav
Jain, Anoop
Sharma, Dushyant
Systems and Control
This paper proposes a cyber-resilient distributed control strategy equipped with attack detection capabilities for islanded AC microgrids in the presence of bounded stealthy cyber attacks affecting both frequency and power information exchanged among neighboring distributed generators (DGs). The proposed control methodology relies on the construction of an auxiliary layer and the establishment of effective inter-layer cooperation between the actual DGs in the control layer and the virtual DGs in the auxiliary layer. This cooperation aims to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing. It is shown that the in situ presence of a concealed auxiliary layer not only guarantees resilience against stealthy bounded attacks on both frequency and power-sharing but also facilitates a network-enabled attack identification mechanism. The paper provides rigorous proof of the stability of the closed-loop system and derives bounds for frequency and power deviations under attack conditions, offering insights into the impact of the attack signal, control and pinning gains, and network connectivity on the system's convergence properties. The performance of the proposed controllers is illustrated by simulating a networked islanded AC microgrid in a Simulink environment showcasing both attributes of attack resilience and attack detection.
title Auxiliary Network-Enabled Attack Detection and Resilient Control of Islanded AC Microgrid
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.00180