Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913186056241152 |
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| author | Bono, James W. Wolpert, David H. |
| author_facet | Bono, James W. Wolpert, David H. |
| contents | It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game's outcome. We explore what happens when external parties -- who we call ``game miners'' -- discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games between miners and players for determining such an outcome-contingent contract. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner's profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_02353 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game Bono, James W. Wolpert, David H. General Economics Economics 91A6, 91A10, 91A20, 91A28 J.4 It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game's outcome. We explore what happens when external parties -- who we call ``game miners'' -- discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games between miners and players for determining such an outcome-contingent contract. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner's profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria. |
| title | Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game |
| topic | General Economics Economics 91A6, 91A10, 91A20, 91A28 J.4 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.02353 |