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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.02666 |
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| _version_ | 1866914630825148416 |
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| author | Kamiyama, Naoyuki |
| author_facet | Kamiyama, Naoyuki |
| contents | In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the stability concepts in this setting. In this paper, we consider the following variant of strong stability, and we consider computational complexity issues for this solution concept. In our setting, we are given a subset of the agents on one side. Then when an agent in this subset is not matched to any partner, this agent cannot become a part of a blocking pair. In this paper, we first prove that the problem of determining the existence of a stable matching in this setting is NP-complete. Then we give two polynomial-time solvable cases of our problem. Interestingly, one of our positive results gives a unified approach to the strongly stable matching problem and the envy-free matching problem. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_02666 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Strongly Stable Matching Problem with Closures Kamiyama, Naoyuki Computer Science and Game Theory In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the stability concepts in this setting. In this paper, we consider the following variant of strong stability, and we consider computational complexity issues for this solution concept. In our setting, we are given a subset of the agents on one side. Then when an agent in this subset is not matched to any partner, this agent cannot become a part of a blocking pair. In this paper, we first prove that the problem of determining the existence of a stable matching in this setting is NP-complete. Then we give two polynomial-time solvable cases of our problem. Interestingly, one of our positive results gives a unified approach to the strongly stable matching problem and the envy-free matching problem. |
| title | The Strongly Stable Matching Problem with Closures |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.02666 |