An Incentive Regulation Approach for Balancing Stakeholder Interests in Transmission Investment

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Xia, Yuxin, Savelli, Iacopo, Morstyn, Thomas
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Xia, Yuxin
Savelli, Iacopo
Morstyn, Thomas
author_facet Xia, Yuxin
Savelli, Iacopo
Morstyn, Thomas
contents The merchant-regulatory mechanism represents a promising tool that combines the benefits of merchant investment and regulated investment, thereby providing efficient incentives for merchant Transmission Companies (Transcos) subject to regulatory compliance. However, one of the drawbacks of the H-R-G-V merchant-regulated mechanism is that it allows the Transco to capture the entire surplus increase resulting from investment, without any economic benefits for consumers and generators. To address this issue, we propose an incentive tuning parameter, which is incorporated into the calculation of the incentive fee for the Transco. Accordingly, the regulatory framework can effectively manage the Transco's profit and allow market participants to access economic benefits, thus ensuring a fair distribution of economic advantages among the stakeholders, while the impact on overall social welfare remains relatively modest.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_03556
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle An Incentive Regulation Approach for Balancing Stakeholder Interests in Transmission Investment
Xia, Yuxin
Savelli, Iacopo
Morstyn, Thomas
Optimization and Control
The merchant-regulatory mechanism represents a promising tool that combines the benefits of merchant investment and regulated investment, thereby providing efficient incentives for merchant Transmission Companies (Transcos) subject to regulatory compliance. However, one of the drawbacks of the H-R-G-V merchant-regulated mechanism is that it allows the Transco to capture the entire surplus increase resulting from investment, without any economic benefits for consumers and generators. To address this issue, we propose an incentive tuning parameter, which is incorporated into the calculation of the incentive fee for the Transco. Accordingly, the regulatory framework can effectively manage the Transco's profit and allow market participants to access economic benefits, thus ensuring a fair distribution of economic advantages among the stakeholders, while the impact on overall social welfare remains relatively modest.
title An Incentive Regulation Approach for Balancing Stakeholder Interests in Transmission Investment
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03556