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Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Arieli, Itai, Geffner, Ivan, Tennenholtz, Moshe
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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